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ABSTRACT
Fugu is an evolution of the MIT Alewife Machine which adds multiuser support by
providing efficient translation and protection services in hardware. These services, as
well as a second data network, are packaged in the User Communication Unit (UCU).
The UCU is tightly integrated with the current Alewife chip set. This document details
the functional specification and the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation
of the UCU. Special attention is paid to the address translation, user protection, and
Alewife integration schemes. The functional specification of the secondary network is
described in [3].
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1 Introduction and Motivation
1.1 Background
Some recent parallel processors, such as the MIT Alewife Machine [1], achieve
high performance by supporting direct user access to the underlying mechanisms for two
paradigms of parallel computation and communication: globally shared memory and
internode message passing. Although considered a standard feature today, many of these
multiprocessors, including Alewife, neglect efficient multiuser support. In fact, they tend
to omit virtual memory, one of the basic foundations necessary for multiuser support.
These massively parallel multiprocessors (MPPs), such as Alewife, are purposely
designed without virtual memory. They are intended to run processes which require all
available hardware resources. For this reason, superior performance is paramount, and
multiuser support is unnecessary. Similarly, virtual memory is not worth the performance
penalty.
Interestingly, modem processor advances have made uniprocessors more attractive.
Processors have become so fast and cheap that it is sometimes hard to justify the purchase
of a typical MPP. In some cases, modern workstations can actually outperform MPPs at
a fraction of the cost. Furthermore, workstations are much more flexible. In addition to
some types of MPP jobs, they also run most other workloads efficiently. Still, there are
classes of jobs which simply require the performance of an MPP.
If scalable, low overhead multiuser support could be built, then the benefits of
uniprocessors could be combined with the benefits of MPPs. Even when scaled to
hundreds of processors, this overhead should not exceed the performance or price costs of
multiuser support on traditional workstations. Under this scenario, low cost workstations
could be expanded into computationally capable MPPs as necessary. Then both types of
workloads could be run simultaneously in a cost effective way. Fugu [5] is a multiuser
extension of Alewife which implements this solution.
1.2 Requirements for Fugu
A multiuser multiprocessor must provide user isolation, which requires translations
and protection checks on all hardware references. Translation and protection present a
convenient virtual machine to each user although they usually incur extra overhead. The
goal of Fugu, then, is to provide for these mechanisms while maintaining as much of the
scalable performance of Alewife as possible.
Fugu's virtual to physical address page tables are distributed throughout the nodes
of the system. For a complete description of Fugu's page tables, see [5]. Efficient
translation, therefore, requires the hardware support of Translation Lookaside Buffers
(TLBs), which are located inside each node's User Communication Unit (UCU). When
the desired translation is cached by the TLB, many potential layers of indirection through
the page tables are bypassed. The speed advantage is even greater if the cached addresses'
page tables are located on remote nodes. Of course, the TLBs and page tables must be
kept consistent. For a complete description of the TLB and page table coherence, see [5].
In addition to address translation, Fugu's TLB provides access restriction checks.
Memory may be marked as readable and writable, readable but not writable, "DMA-able,"
or invalid. These access qualifiers are independently specified for the supervisor and the
user. They are checked in parallel with translation. Incoming messages are protected by
a hardware Group Identification (GID) check, which enables both the prompt delivery of
messages and an efficient means of network isolation.
1.3 Goal
The goal of this thesis is to design and test the translation and protection schemes
discussed in Section 1.2. Additionally, they will be integrated with the secondary network
[31 in the UCU. Essentially, this thesis provides the hardware support necessary for
scalable multiuser operation.
2 Leveraging Alewife To Implement Fugu
2.1 Alewife's Node Architecture
The basic layout of an Alewife node is shown in Figure 1. The Sparcle, an
extension of the SPARC architecture [2], serves as the central processing unit. The
Communication and Memory Management Unit (CMMU) handles all memory accesses,
whether they be local or remote. Message passing and DMA are also handled by the
CMMU, which is accessed both explicitly, by memory mapped registers, and implicitly,
by loads and stores which the CMMU interprets as shared memory operations.
Figure 1: Alewife node architecture.
2.2 Adding Translation and Protection
Because the CMMU is currently designed to understand a globally shared, single
address space, upgrading Alewife to Fugu entails placing both the translation logic and
the protection logic between the Sparcle and the CMMU. This placement allows the
processor to utilize multiple protected virtual address spaces while the CMMU maintains
its view of the single coherent physical address space. Of course, if the CMMU maintains
coherent memory and caches, the multiple address spaces seen by the Sparcle will also
remain coherent.
Similarly, message protection is placed between the CMMU and the Sparcle.
Regardless of whether a message is currently deliverable, the CMMU should still receive
the message. Because Alewife's network is worm-hole routed, many potential links
could become tied up if the CMMU waited. Of course, it is possible that the destination
process is not currently running, causing the message to be undeliverable. The potential
problem is obvious if any node has two independent processes which are simultaneously
polling for messages from the network. The determination of a message's deliverability,
then, must be accomplished by logic placed between the CMMU and the Sparcle. Because
each group of processes is assigned a unique Group Identification (GID), this message
protection logic is called the GID check.
2.3 The Secondary Network
The upgrade to Fugu actually requires one more hardware addition to the Alewife
node: a second, system only network. Empirically, it was determined that the user could
fill up and deadlock the general system network. Both situations cause the supervisor
problems because it cannot send scheduling or other maintenance information between
nodes when the system network is full. To correct this problem, a proposed addition for
Fugu is a second network which is only accessible to the supervisor [3, 5]. Briefly, this
network has two intended uses: emergency scheduling and overflow paging.
Interestingly, the secondary network does not need to support a high bandwidth.
This observation is readily apparent from the intended use of the secondary network.
Scheduling information only needs to be sent through the secondary network when the
primary system network is busy. Similarly, overflow pages are sent through the secondary
network rarely [3].
The low bandwidth necessary will be exploited to make the secondary network
primitive as compared to the primary system network. This reduction in throughput
capacity will allow for a much simpler and smaller network controller. In fact, it will
allow the network controller to share space with the TLB and GID check in a single chip,
called the User Communication Unit (UCU).
2.4 The User Communication Unit (UCU)
Much like the TLB and the CMMU, the secondary network must be directly
accessible from the processor. As discussed, its purpose is to deliver important scheduling
information. Any extra layer between the network and the processor would only hamper
the prompt delivery of these messages by increasing latency. Similarly, the GID check
must be tightly integrated with the CMMU, the Sparcle, and the TLB.
Because of the similar proximity constraints of the TLB, the GID check, and the
secondary network, it would be convenient to package these units together in one chip.
In fact, they will be packaged in one processor accessible chip called the User
Communication Unit (UCU). The benefits of placing these three modules together can
also be seen from a more practical standpoint. This packaging reduces the amount of
effort needed to design and debug the Fugu node board.
It is important to realize, however, that the addition of the UCU is not the performance
optimized migration of Alewife to Fugu. If such an implementation of Fugu were made,
the TLB would be integrated with the Sparcle, and the secondary network and GID check
would be integrated with the CMMU. This difference in packaging would create a much
faster node overall as it bypasses the extra delay incurred by accessing an additional chip.
2.5 Fugu's Node Architecture
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the Fugu node. As described, the only difference
between the Alewife node and the Fugu node is the addition of the UCU, which includes
Fugu's TLB, GID check, and secondary network. The functional specifications of the
TLB and GID check are discussed in the sections that follow, and the implementation of
the secondary network is discussed in [3].
Figure 2: Fugu node architecture.
3 Functional Specification
Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the UCU, which consists of the TLB, the
secondary network, the GID check, and the bus interface. The most important peripheral
modules, the Sparcle and the CMMU, are also shown. Additionally, the secondary
network connections are depicted. As will be seen in the sections that follow, these
modules combine to provide the basis for a fast, flexible means of user isolation, thus
enabling scalable multiuser support.
Although the TLB, GID check, bus interface, and secondary network share many
common signals, their specifications will be discussed independently in the sections that
follow. This separation is reasonable because of the large differences in the underlying
goals of each module. Furthermore, the outputs of each module are conceptually and
electrically separate. Note, however, that the bus interface serves as the intermediary for
the other modules.
UCU
Figure 3: The blocks contained within the UCU.
3.1 The TLB
Simply put, the purpose of the TLB is to speed address translation and protection.
In this section, we examine some of the features necessary to meet this goal, such as the
translation modes and the programming interface. Special attention will be paid to the
translation path, the performance limiting path.
3.1.1 Translation Modes
For the kernel's virtual memory handler to function correctly, it must be continually
accessible. If the page handler was swapped out for any reason, a succeeding page fault
could never be resolved. One solution to this problem is to disallow swapping of the
page handlers. Special, unswappable pages could be marked as such upon their creation.
Fugu takes an alternative approach to implementing this functionality by providing three
TLB bypass mechanisms: total TLB disable, lower megabyte of address space bypass,
and supervisor requested bypass, which includes Alternate Space Identifier (ASI) aliasing.
(Section 3.1.4 discusses the purpose of the ASIs.)
When setting up the kernel space or for operating in a single address space, it may
be useful to turn off the TLB completely. The TLB supports this disabled mode, in
which it simply passes all address untranslated. Additionally, the TLB never translates
any address in any context in the bottom megabyte of address space. This feature allows
one megabyte of space for all kernel code which must always be accessible.
Finally, certain supervisor ASIs cause translation to be bypassed. The TLB aliases
these ASIs to otherwise normal ASIs, although some are treated specially by the CMMU.
The purpose of this operation is to bypass the TLB while maintaining normal CMMU
operation. It provides the supervisor a means of directly accessing physical memory
without needing to find, or even worse, to create, the virtual translation. Table 1 lists the
ASIs which are translated as well as the resulting ASI aliases. As can be seen, the aliased
ASIs are simply the inputted ASI with the fifth bit set to zero.
ASI range to translate Translated ASI range
0x20-0x3F Ox00-0x1F
0x60-0x7F 0x40-0x5F
Table 1: The ASIs which are translated and the ASIs they translate to.
3.1.2 CID Extension
For a TLB hit in a single address space architecture, it is only necessary that the
tag portion of the memory matches the virtual address presented. In a multiple address
space paradigm, however, it is also necessary that the address be associated with the
currently running group or context (see Section 4.1.5). Therefore, Fugu's TLB registers
the currently running Context Identification (CID). Every time a tag is written to a TLB
element, this CID is automatically appended. For a cache line to hit during translation,
the tags and the associated CIDs must be independently equal.
This procedure allows translations for multiple groups to coexist in the TLB. In
other words, TLB entries do not have to be invalidated when the context switches.
Because the TLB does not have access to the currently running CID, however, the
supervisor must update this register on every switch (see Appendix 1.1). Fortunately,
updating the CID register is much less expensive than invalidating all TLB entries,
especially if some TLB entries are utilized after their contexts have been swapped back
in.
3.1.3 Protection and Faults
In a multiuser machine, protections are a key part of system stability. For example,
some addresses should be marked as only assessable to the supervisor. For performance
optimization, the TLB actually performs these protection checks in parallel with translation.
The TLB maintains four protection bits for every entry. Collectively called DGPP,
they define the full access control for the address. The D bit actually has a second
purpose: it is the "DMA-able" bit and indicates whether DMA operations may be performed
on an address. The G bit is named the "Global" bit for historical reasons. The PP bits
form the Protection field, although all four bits really combine for this purpose. Table 2
lists all possible access combinations.
To make use of the information presented in Table 2, the TLB must know whether
the current operation is a read or write, at user or supervisor level, or for DMA. This
knowledge, combined with the four protection bits, combinationally produces a three bit
fault code. The possible input combinations are listed in Table 3 and the possible fault
codes are listed in Table 4. Note that the fault generation logic produces the three bit
Table 2: The access permitted for each combination of the
DGPP bits. RO means read only and R/W indicates both read
and write access. DMA transactions require the D bit to be set.
D=0 D=I
G P P user super user super
0 0 0 invalid - RO
0 0 1 RO RO RO RO
0 1 0 RO R/W RO R/W
0 1 1 R/W R/W R/W R/W
1 0 0 invalid - RO
1 0 1 - RO - RO
1 1 0 - R/W - R/W
1 1 1 RO R/W RO R/W
Key: access proceeds
invalid fault
user fault
write Fault
DMA write fault
IMA read fault
Table 3: The faults associated with specific accesses and protections.
The bits stored in the TLB are specified horizontally while the
bits derived from the current operation are specified vertically.
sequence 111 when no fault is present. This allows a simple three input and gate to
produce the "no protection fault" signal.
Maintaining protection violations isn't quite as straightforward as one might think.
Because the Sparcle is a pipelined processor, many different faults are possible from all
instructions currently being processed. For example, one instruction might be writing to
a read only page while the next instruction attempts to read from a page which is not
currently loaded in the TLB. To maintain consistency with the order of faults serviced,
EMA: D = 0 D= 1
Global: G=0 G= G=0 G = 1
PP= 0011 0011 0011 0011
0101 0101 0101 0101
s read: I--- I---
u write: IW-- IW-- WW-- WW--
p IMA-r: ICCC ICCC
IMA-w: IAAA IAAA AA-- AA--
u read: I--- IUU- U--- UUU-
s write: IWW- IUUU UWW- UUUU
e IEMA-r: ICCC IUUC U - - - UUU-
r EMA-w: IAAA IUUU UAA- UUUU
Table 4: The fault codes.
the TLB only maintains the first fault seen after the last probe for faults. Additionally,
whenever the TLB is probed for a fault code, it clears the stored fault code. This
procedure allows the kernel to more easily differentiate between TLB related faults and
other unrelated faults.
The TLB actually causes a trap by forcing the CMMU to cause a trap. The TLB
emits a physical address with the four high order bits set to the hexadecimal value Oxl,
which maps to shared memory on nonexistent processors. These addresses causes the
CMMU to trap the Sparcle. Kernel code can then probe for the cause of the trap (see
Appendix 1.6).
3.1.4 Interconnecting The TLB, The Sparcle, and The CMMU
The Sparcle instruction set provides an 8 bit Alternate Space Identifier (ASI) with
every address. In Fugu, these ASIs have many uses, such as distinguishing between
supervisor and user accesses. The TLB makes use of several ASI's for its own internal
operations. As presented in Section 3.1.1, the TLB also has the ability to change the ASI
on its way to the CMMU. From the above discussion, it follows that the TLB must
Code Fault
0 Refill
1 Invalid
2 Write Fault
3 User Fault
4 DMA Write Fault
5 DMA Read Fault
6 Undefined
7 No Fault
receive the virtual address and ASI buses from the Sparcle and provide the physical
address and ASI buses to the CMMU. For protection operations, the TLB also makes use
of two Sparcle signals: one which specifies a read operation and one which specifies a
supervisor operation.
UCU operations (discussed in Section 3.4) involve complex interplay between the
Sparcle, the UCU, and the CMMU. While the purpose of these signals is discussed in
Section 4.4, it is noted here that the UCU also makes use of the following signals: The
Sparcle's supervisor bit as an input, the CMMU's supervisor bit as an output, the CMMU's
sigoe signal as an input, the CMMU's regAck signal as an input, and the CMMU's
regHold signal as an output. Essentially, these signals combine to provide a sophisticated
handshaking scheme between the three chips.
3.2 The GID Check
3.2.1 Background
For complete user isolation, messages as well as memory references must be
protected. As one might expect, there are many ways to accomplish this goal. For
example, the kernel could be trusted to check the destination of all messages and then
ensure the correct distribution of these messages. Unfortunately, this method requires a
lot of overhead. Unless the supervisor is currently running, there are a minimum of two
context switches to implement this solution: one to load the kernel and then one to load
the receiving process. Furthermore, the kernel might have to buffer the message, which
requires copying the message at least twice before it is received.
Alewife was designed to avoid this overhead by allowing the user process direct
access to the network hardware. Although extra precautions must be taken to ensure
forward progress under this scheme, it is clear that this method will increase performance
dramatically under the optimal case, when the receiving process is running and ready to
receive. Fortunately, it has been determined that the optimal case is also the usual case
[5]. Therefore, this method increases performance dramatically.
Unfortunately, maintaining protection under this situation is difficult. The network
hardware must ensure that the proper process is running before beginning delivery.
Furthermore, unless sufficient network buffer space is preset, there must be some mechanism
for buffering the network data when the incorrect process is running. If the message is
allowed to stay in the network for too long, the network might fill up and block.
3.2.2 Operation of The GID Check
The GID check supports these two necessary mechanisms, delivery protection and
network saturation protection, by imitating the network hardware's message polling
protocols. In Alewife, polling for a message is accomplished by reading from a memory
mapped address. If a message is present, the CMMU will return the message header and
set Alewife's full bit. If no message is present, the data returned is undefined and the full
bit is cleared.
With this protocol in place, the GID check simply snoops for a load of this
memory mapped location. After a load of this location has been detected, the full bit is
checked. If the full bit is low, then the GID check passes all signals unaltered. Similarly,
the virtual supervisor bit is checked. If the Sparcle is currently in supervisor mode, then
all signals are passed unaltered. The remaining case, of course, is a message waiting
during a user load. In this case, the GID check verifies that the destination GID included
in the header matches the currently loaded GID in the UCU's GID register. If the GID
matches, then all signals are again passed unaltered; the protection check has passed.
However, if the GID does not match, the GID check forces the full bit clear, causing the
polling process to continue as if no message has arrived. Additionally, the GID check
interrupts the Sparcle and the CMMU via the external interrupt signal. This causes a
special kernel handler to be run which properly empties the message into a buffer.
The performance benefit of this procedure is clear if the destination GIDs are
usually running when their messages arrive. Fortunately, it has been determined that this
is the common case. The expensive kernel control described above is rare, and thus there
is a great performance benefit realized by adding the hardware GID check.
3.3 The Secondary Network
The secondary network provides a low bandwidth backup for the main system
network. The motivation and implementation of the secondary network are discussed in
[3]. Section 4.3 describes the programming interface for the secondary network.
3.4 The Unified Programming Interface
For proper UCU functionality, many registers must be updated. For example, the
virtual tags and physical translations must be written to the TLB's memory. Similarly,
when TLB related faults occur, the kernel must be able to find the cause by probing the
TLB. For these and other functions, the UCU has its own instruction set. All instructions
are specified by special ASIs, which are listed in Table 5. Note that the last four instructions
are for the secondary network. These instructions, as well as a couple listed instructions
which have side effects for the GID check, are fully described in Appendix 1.
Interestingly, the programming interface for all three UCU modules is unified.
All UCU operations are accessed via "colored" Sparcle loads and stores. A "colored"
load or store is one which has a special Alternate Space Identifier (ASI). These special
ASI's are recognized by the UCU bus interface and cause a special sequence of events
(see section 3.5).
Due to the unified nature of the programming interface, it is convenient to place
its logic in one module. Doing so makes sense from a design point of view because it
eliminates redundant logic. Furthermore, distributing control among all modules reduces
performance because multiplexers are required at the outputs. Because a relatively slow
technology is being used to implement the UCU, any extra performance gain is welcomed.
3.5 The Bus Interface: The XROM Space
The UCU bus interface is quite simple during a normal translation operation. The
virtual address bus is an input to the UCU, and the physical address translation is an
output. The offset bits are unchanged by the UCU, and as such, are bypassed on the
printed circuit board.
UCU loads and stores, however, are slightly more complicated. As mentioned- in
section 3.4, the UCU recognizes these operations by special ASIs, which are listed in
Table 5. When a special ASI is spotted, the UCU must make sure that only it and the
Sparcle have control of the address and data buses. If the CMMU or cache still had
control, for example, contention would result. Furthermore, to simplify the logic necessary
for the UCU's bus interface, it would be convenient if UCU operations progressed with
an uninterruptible sequence of cycles. Because of the possibility of cache misses and
remote message arrivals, this type of atomic sequence of cycles is extremely hard to
guarantee.
Fortunately, the CMMU has an interface for handling this type of situation. Namely,
an external memory (XROM) access causes the CMMU to finish all outstanding transactions
and then ready for an atomic sequence. Any other unexpected and possibly asynchronous
events are queued until the XROM access is over. The UCU makes extensive use of the
XROM space to greatly simplify its bus interface.
20
Table 5: The TLB instructions.
4 Implementation
Although all three main sections of the UCU have been developed separately,
there are a few underlying similarities. For example, the bus interface, which is discussed
in Sections 3.5 and 4.4, is unified. Additionally, all components of the UCU have been
written in Verilog. The Verilog code is merged together and compiled for a single FPGA
(see Section 5).
Specifically, the UCU is implemented with a Xilinx 4025 for a few reasons. 1)
The 4025 supports distributed placement of SRAM, which is important for the TLB. 2)
The 4025 is deemed to be one of few FPGAs currently on the market which is large
enough to fit the UCU. The 4025 has both sufficient gate count and sufficient SRAM
capacity. 3) Xilinx continues to evolve this series of FPGAs. Bigger and faster 4000
series chips will be available in the future, potentially enabling much larger and faster
TLBs and higher bandwidth secondary networks.
ASI Command Name Mode
0x50 TLB Control r/w
0x51 Element Data r/w
0x52 Element Tag r
0x53 Element Random w
OxD4 Probe r
OxD5 DMA Read r
OxD6 DMA Write r
0x58 Snet Output r/w
0x59 Snet Input r
Ox5A Snet Machine Info r/w
Ox5C Snet Status/Command r/w
4.1 The TLB
In this section, we examine the design of Fugu's TLB. Some design parameters,
such as the 32 bit virtual and physical address spaces, have been imposed by the Alewife
architecture. Other parameters have been tuned to meet the needs of Fugu.
Section 4.1.1 describes the overall organization of the TLB. Section 4.1.2 details
a generic translation path commonly used for a single column of a TLB while the
remaining sections examine the extensions and enhancements used for Fugu. The parameters
of the TLB are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: The TLB column organization.
4.1.1 The Overall TLB Architecture
The overall architecture of the TLB is shown in Figure 4. During normal operating
modes, the translation path is active. It is purely combinational, which is necessary due
to the timing constraints of the Sparcle processor. Sparcle emits a valid virtual address
before the positive edge of the clock. The virtual to physical address translation must
also be complete before the same positive edge of the clock.
During translation, the memory cells are controlled by the inputs from the Sparcle.
However, when a special TLB operation is recognized (see Appendix 1) by the "Op
Logic" shown in Figure 4, a state machine assumes control of the memory cells. This
Virtual Address Size 32 bits
Physical Address Size 32 bits
Page Size 4 kilobytes
TLB Organization 4-Way, Set Associative
Entries Per Column 32
Total TLB Entries 128
state machine is depicted by the Read/Write logic in Figure 4, and it ensures correct
completion of the requested function, while maintaining the correct bus interface. The
UCU's unified bus interface overlaps with this block.
The TLB has been implemented in the Verilog hardware description language.
This code implements the functionality discussed previously and developed in the following
sections in a straight forward manner with one exception: the SRAM, which uses hard
macros. The macros are termed hard macros because they are defined in Xilinx's proprietary
XNF format and not in the Verilog language. The Xilinx program memgen is used to
generate these macros. It is believed that memgen generates efficient SRAM with respect
to both time and space.
Virt. Adc
From Sp,
Controls
From
Sparcle
Data To
and Fron
Sparcle
Figure 4: Overall TLB organization.
4.1.2 A Generic TLB Translation Architecture
Figure 5 shows a generic translation architecture for a single set of a basic multiple
set associative TLB. Although Fugu's TLB extends this architecture, it is presented first
for clarity. Fugu's enhancements are discussed in Sections 4.1.3 through 4.1.6.
The set shown in Figure 5 contains two equally deep sections of memory. One
section stores the tag, which is used to determine the contents of the TLB's entries. The
second memory section contains the physical address translation.
The low order bits of the Virtual Page Number (VPN) are used to index into both
sections of memory. The number of bits used is determined by the depth of the sections
of memory; in the current implementation of Fugu's TLB, the memories have 32 entries,
and thus the 5 low order bits of the VPN are used for the index. For the determination of
the depth of the memory cells, see Section 4.1.3.
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Figure 5: A basic TLB organization. The memory cells
are equally deep and in this case equally wide.
The tag is formed by the high order bits of the virtual page number (see Section
4.1.4 for the determination of the page size, and thus the amount of bits remaining for the
VPN). Specifically, the tag bits must uniquely specify which virtual page number resides
in the TLB. Because the 5 low order bits of the VPN are already specified by which
memory locations the TLB accesses, only the remaining 15 high order bits of the virtual
page number must be stored in the tag section of the memory.
When a virtual address is presented to the TLB, the memories indexed by the low
order bits of the VPN are examined. The contents of the tag sections of each set are then
simultaneously compared to the top 15 bits of the supplied virtual page number. If the
contents of the tag memory from any of the sets equals the supplied VPN, that set has a
TLB hit. The translation stored in the Physical Page Number (PPN) memory of that set is
placed on the outgoing address bus. If no set hits, a TLB refill trap is placed on the
address bus (see section 3.1.3). It is up to the refill code of the supervisor to ensure that
identical tags are not placed in more than one set.
4.1.3 Depth of the Memory Sets
Xilinx SRAM cells are packed efficiently only when they store a multiple of 16
bits. Any other storage size will cause wasted Combinational Lookup Blocks (CLBs),
the basic logic generators in the Xilinx architecture. Because the CLBs are in limited
supply, they should not be wasted. Since the width of the memory cells of the TLB are
not multiples of 16 bits, the memories are made 32 entries deep. This depth allows
efficient memory packing no matter how wide the SRAM cells are. Of course, the sets
could just as easily be made 48 entries deep without any loss of CLB utilization. Section
4.1.5 will show that this depth is undesirable because the extra SRAM could be better
utilized in a more highly associative cache. Furthermore, a depth of 16 is undesirable
because of the extra bussing required for the extra sets of memory present.
4.1.4 Page Size
A virtual address actually contains two portions: a virtual page number and an
offset. To exploit the spacial locality of program references, thereby reducing the amount
of memory swapping necessary, virtual memory is actually swapped in contiguous chunks
of address space called a page. The offset portion of the virtual address specifies an
index into a virtual page, which is specified by the VPN.
When virtualizing memory, an important question is how large to make the pages.
A large page could reduce the amount of page swapping necessary. The larger the page,
however, the larger the penalty incurred upon swapping, especially if the page resides on
a remote node. A page size of 4k (12 bits) is chosen for Fugu because it is a nice balance
between these two constraints. Interestingly, it is on the small side of the page sizes
commonly used for distributed shared memory machines.
Because the TLB only needs to translate the virtual page numbers and not the
offsets within the page, the TLB is only concerned with translating the top 20 bits of the
32 bit virtual address. During ordinary translation operations, the bottom 12 bits simply
pass through the TLB. Alternatively, as implemented with Fugu, the offset bits could be
bypassed on the printed circuit board.
4.1.5 Associativity
Another important design consideration is the associativity of the TLB. For a
given amount of memory, the TLB could either be deeper (more entries per set) or more
associative (more sets). The deeper cache works well in a single context situation.
Unfortunately, when the context switches, most memory references will have to be reloaded
into the cache. It is important to remember that to simplify process launching, most of
the processes will be running in the same general ranges of virtual address space. Thus,
if every process needs to access the contents of their virtual memory location 100, every
context switch should cause a miss and reload of location 100. Very commonly, TLBs
invalidate every entry when switching contexts. This prevents the TLB from computing
improper translations. Fugu's TLB, on the other hand, keeps track of which context a
valid tag belongs to (see Section 3.1.2). This prevents the TLB from having to invalidate
every entry upon every context switch.
Even though Fugu's TLB entries need not be invalidated upon every context
switch, there is another problem. The general TLB translation architecture presented in
Section 4.1.1 only provides as many spots for any given virtual address as there are sets
in the TLB. These spots must be shared among all processes requiring the same and
other potentially overlapping addresses. (Addresses overlap spots in the TLB when the
bottom five bits of their VPNs are equal.) Thus, processes running in the same virtual
address ranges will tend to overwrite other processes' TLB entries. If this entry elimination
occurs at every context switch, performance is not much better than that seen if every
TLB entry is invalidated upon every context switch.
An approach around this second multiple context problem is to index the cache
not just by the lower bits of the VPN, but also by the context ID. In general, there are
many hashing functions which could be used to compute the index. In Fugu, the entries
are indexed by the lower 5 bits of the VPN logically XORed with the lower 5 bits of the
CID. The XOR function was chosen because of its simplicity and its effect of locating
the same VPN from adjacent groups on as many different cache lines as possible.
While indexing the cache as described does tend to move different processes'
addresses onto different cache lines, it still does not solve the cache line collision problem.
Quite simply, increasing the associativity of the cache reduces this problem. The other
problems presented in this section are also reduced as the associativity of the TLB rises.
Unfortunately, the Xilinx architecture limits the amount of associativity which can be
utilized efficiently. As discussed in section 4.1.3, it is undesirable to lower the depth of
the sets below 16 entries, which limits the amount of associativity available. In fact, the
degree of associativity chosen is equal to the number of sets which are believed to fit in
the Xilinx 4025 using 32 entry sets.
4.1.6 Putting It All Together: The TLB's Translation Path
Figure 6 shows the overall translation path of the Fugu TLB. While it shows only
a single set of the TLB, it depicts most of the functionality presented to this point,
including the CID section of the tag memory, the protection bits, and the fault generation
logic.
4.2 The GID Check
Section 3.2 describes the functionality of the GID check. This section clearly
defines the implementation of the GID and then shows an example of the GID check.
4.2.1 Definition of The GID
Before discussing the implementation of the GID check, a few key terms must be
clearly defined in terms of the UCU's implementation. The Context ID, or the CID, is an
ID for all processes local to a node. All unique virtual address spaces have a unique CID.
If local processes share the same CID, then they are operating in the same virtual address
space. The Group ID, or the GID, however, is assigned to distributed processes. In other
words, processes with an assigned GID are operating within the same virtual address
space on more than one node.
Fugu's CIDs are 8 bits wide, which permits 256 unique, local, virtual address
spaces. Due to message header constraints, however, Fugu's GIDs are limited to 7 bits,
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Figure 6: The overall translation path of the Fugu TLB.
This figure depicts one set of a multi-set TLB.
which allows for 128 unique, distributed processes. By definition, these distributed
processes should reside in their own virtual address spaces. Although it might be necessary
to allow for more than 128 global process IDs, it is hypothesized that 128 unique local
processes per node is sufficient for Fugu.
Therefore, to reduce complexity, both the CID and the GID actually share the
same register in the UCU. The GID is defined as the lower 7 bits of the CID register.
Further, a CID with the high order bit set is defined to be a local process while a CID
with the high order bit cleared is defined to be a GID whose GID is equal to the lower 7
bits of the CID register.
4.2.2 An Example of The GID Check
Figure 7 shows the GID check in action. It is the output of test vectors applied
from a Verilog test program. The first trace is the clock signal upon which all synchronous
logic is generated. The second trace is the state of the testing machine. The remaining
traces are, in order, the virtual address bus (aBusIn), the physical address bus (aBusOut),
the virtual ASI bus (asiln), the physical ASI bus (asiOut), bits 17 through 23 of the data
bus ([23:17]), the virtual supervisor bit (suln), the full bit from the CMMU (cccOin), the
full bit emitted to the Sparcle (cccOout), the GID (GID), and finally, the IRQ request
from the GID hardware (gidIrq). Bits 17 through 23 of the data bus contain the destination
GID when a message header is read. To reduce Figure 7 to the interesting parts of the
GID check, the reset states are not shown. Furthermore, the TLB is enabled and the CID
is set to 0x04, which is not shown.
A GID check begins in State 6. In this state, the special ASI OxcO is presented
with the special offset address of 0x080. The GID Check recognizes this address and will
be watching the data bus, the supervisor bit, and the full bit on the next cycle. If the full
bit is not set, then there is no message waiting, and the GID check does nothing. Similarly,
if the supervisor bit is high, then the kernel is currently running, and all messages are
deliverable. Hence, the GID alters nothing.
As can be seen in state 7, the supervisor bit is not set while the full bit is set.
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Therefore, a message is waiting during a user level probe. For this reason, the GID check
matches the GID in the destination field of the data bus (bits 17 through 23) with the
lower 7 bits of the CID register. In this case, the GID matches, and so the GID Check
passes all signals unchanged. This determination is done combinationally, which causes
the full bit that the GID Check outputs to the Sparcle to be undefined while the data bus
is undefined. This period of uncertainty poses no problems because the full bit from the
CMMU is also undefined at this time.
State 8 shows another message header probe. This operation looks identical to
that shown in state 6. However, in state 9, it can be seen that the GID returned by the
CMMU does not match the GID stored in the UCU. Because of the mismatch, the GID
check combinationally forces the full bit (cccOout) to 0. In order to meet the timing
model for the upcoming branch on full instruction, the UCU actually holds the full bit in
the empty state through an additional positive edge. With this procedure complete, it will
appear to the running process that no message is waiting in the network buffers.
Although the GID check has now successfully protected the message interface,
the kernel should be made aware of the waiting message so that it can free the network
resources. Therefore, at the positive edge following the realization of the mismatch, the
GID check asserts its IRQ request line. The IRQ will cause an external interrupt, which
will force a kernel handler to be run. Although the kernel should free the message from
the network hardware at this point, there are many other additional actions which the
kernel might take.
4.3 The Secondary Network
The implementation of the secondary network is described in [3]. However, in
this section, we make note of a few implementation details about the secondary network
bus interface.
As discussed in Section 3.4, the UCU interface has been unified into a single
module. Therefore, many of the secondary network registers are actually maintained
within the bus interface. These registers are read and written exactly as any other UCU
register would be.
However, there are some registers, such as the input and output buffers, which are
located in the secondary network module. With these registers, there is the unfortunate
possibility of usage contention between the UCU interface and the secondary network
itself. To avoid this problem, there is a handshaking scheme in which data read from the
secondary network is presented on the second positive edge following the request. In
order for this to work, the UCU must assert regHold to stall the XROM read operation
one cycle. For secondary network writes, however, the handshaking scheme does not
create any problems; these write operations proceed exactly as they would for the TLB's
registers.
4.4 The UCU Bus Interface: The XROM Space
As discussed in Section 3.5, the UCU makes extensive use of the CMMU's
XROM space in order to simplify bus operations. This section describes the implementation
of the XROM space. Section 4.5 will show examples of the usage of the XROM space.
Much like most other CMMU operations, the XROM space is a supervisor level,
memory mapped access. It is defined to be addresses with the 4 high order bits set to
0x6. To ensure that the XROM access occurs at supervisor level, the supervisor bit must
be set during the cycle following the positive edge that the address is valid. The Sparcle
defines this placement of the supervisor bit, which the CMMU and UCU must honor.
Furthermore, a supervisor ASI must be emitted along with the XROM address.
Although perhaps counterintuitive, setting the supervisor bit is not sufficient to define a
supervisor access because roughly half of the ASIs are defined at user level. Any of the
remaining ASIs, which, of course, are defined at supervisor level, should work. Therefore,
the UCU uses the supervisor ASI OxOb during bus operations.
To summarize this discussion, the UCU does three things when a special ASI is
detected. First, it combinationally emits a physical address with the 4 high order bits set
to 0x6. Second, it combinationally sets the ASI to OxOb. Third and finally, it ensures that
the supervisor bit is high during the next cycle.
Upon completion of this procedure, the CMMU will log the XROM request. An
indeterminate number of cycles later, the CMMU will grant the XROM request by raising
the regAck signal. In the common case, regAck will be raised during the same cycle as
the XROM request has been made. There are many situations, such as cache refills,
which could delay the start of the XROM operation any number of cycles.
Once regAck is raised, only one of two possible sequences of cycles is run next.
A read operation will result in one sequence of events while a write operation will result
in the other. Both of these sequences begin the first positive edge that regAck is high. It
is important to reiterate that nothing, including external interrupts, can stall either of these
sequences once they have begun.
If the operation is a write, then the data to be written to the UCU comes from the
Sparcle and will be valid surrounding the next positive edge of the clock. With no UCU
intervention, the next address to be translated will be presented before the next positive
edge following the appearance of the data.
Because of setup and hold time constraints, this brief presentation of the data may
not be long enough for proper handing within the UCU. Therefore, under certain
circumstances, the UCU raises another CMMU signal called regHold which will extend
the write cycle. RegHold is raised just following the positive edge in which the data is
presented and must be held high throughout the remainder of the cycle. After the UCU
lowers regHold, the data from the Sparcle will become invalid. Furthermore, the address
of the next operation will be emitted before the next positive edge. Of course, the UCU
must properly handle this address.
Read operations function similarly to writes. The UCU provides the requested
information on the positive edge following the positive edge in which regAck has gone
high. To ensure that the UCU meets the setup and hold times of the Sparcle, the UCU
actually emits the data from the previous negative edge until the following negative edge.
This procedure is allowable because the CMMU has ensured that there is no other bus
driver during either of these two cycles. They are reserved as the so called "bus turn
around" cycles.
As with writes, the UCU can stall the read process by asserting regHold. Again,
regHold must be asserted just past the positive edge in which the data was to be presented
to the Sparcle. Assertion of regHold must continue throughout the rest of the cycle. The
UCU then drops regHold just past the positive edge in which it has written the data. At
this point, the operation will complete as if regHold had not been raised. In other words,
before the arrival of the next positive edge, the Sparcle will emit the address of the next
operation.
4.5 An Example of The UCU Bus Interface
The UCU bus interface is similar for all UCU reads, as is the interface for all
UCU writes. This section discusses one such UCU read, one such UCU write, a typical
translation operation, and a TLB fault. The specifics of all UCU instructions are discussed
in Appendix 1. Furthermore, the XROM interface used for UCU reads and writes is
described in Section 4.4.
Figure 8 shows the signals used to interface between the Sparcle, CMMU, and
UCU. In these traces, the Sparcle and CMMU are simulated by a testing state machine
written in Verilog. The first trace is the clock whose edges are used to synthesize all
synchronous logic. The second trace shows the state of this simulator. The remaining
traces, in order, are the virtual address bus (aBusIn), the physical address bus (aBusOut),
the virtual ASI (asiln), the physical ASI (asiOut), regAck, regHold, readProc (high if the
current operation is a read), the virtual supervisor bit (suln), the physical supervisor bit
(suOut), and finally, the data bus (dBus).
In order to eliminate the uninteresting states of the simulation shown in Figure 8,
a few important cycles have been left out. Namely, the missing states reset the UCU,
enable the TLB, and set the current CID to 4. Clearly, these instructions are necessary
for the correct functionality of what follows.
An Element Data Write command begins in state 6. The UCU recognizes this
operation by it's special ASI, 0x51. Combinationally, the UCU emits a physical address
with the 4 high order bits set to 0x6 and an ASI of OxOb. Furthermore, the UCU ensures
that the supervisor bit (suOut) is high during the next cycle. This procedure imitates the
external memory (XROM) space of the CMMU, which is discussed in Section 4.4.
Shortly after the CMMU latches the XROM request at the positive edge of the clock, the
CMMU marks the beginning of the XROM access by raising the regAck signal. The
UCU notes this information at the first positive edge of the clock in which regAck is
high.
The UCU expects the store data to be valid at the following positive edge. Because
this data is being written into Xilinx memory cells, the Xilinx setup and hold times must
be met. In order to meet these requirements, the UCU asserts regHold for three cycles,
which will keep the data valid for the same three cycles. The first cycle is used to meet
the setup time while the second cycle is used to write the data. Finally, the third cycle is
used to ensure that the hold time is met. As can bee seen in Appendix 1.2, the data
written is a physical page number translation of OxI lIa for virtual page number Ox100.
Furthermore, the protection bits (DGPP) are set to Oxb.
Next, at state 8, the correct translation of virtual page number Ox 100 is seen. The
physical page number Oxl 1 la is sent to the CMMU via the physical address bus aBusOut.
Figure 8: A TLB write, translate, and read operation. The waves shown are those
used to interface between the Sparcle, CMMU, and TLB.
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The offset bits, in this case 0x120, are passed unchanged.
Beginning at state 9, the test code probes for the previously written translation via
a Probe Read command (see Appendix 1.6). As can be seen in Figure 8, the XROM
interface is imitated exactly as before. Again, the UCU waits for the next positive edge
during which regAck is raised. Once this condition is met, the UCU must provide the
necessary data bus data on the following positive edge. To ensure that the data is valid
long enough surrounding the edge to meet all setup and hold times, the UCU actually
provides the data all the way from the previous negative edge to the following negative
edge. Because this procedure is extremely conservative, it guarantees that the setup and
hold times are met.
Interestingly, the Sparcle presents the virtual address of the next operation during
the same positive edge that the UCU places data on the data bus. Although it may seem
that this sequence forces the TLB to be translating while presenting data bus data, the
address is actually nullified by the Sparcle. Therefore, it does not matter what physical
address is emitted during this cycle.
State 12 presents the final type of "normal" UCU operation, a fault. During this
cycle, the virtual page number 0x200 is presented to the TLB. This VPN has not been
loaded in the UCU and therefore causes a TLB Refill Fault. The UCU causes all faults
by combinationally supplying a physical address with the 4 high order bits set to Oxl.
The CMMU will then cause a kernel handler to be run. This handler probes the UCU to
learn cause of the fault (see Appendix 1.1).
5 Methodology
Figure 9 shows the design methodology used for the UCU. Various representations
of the UCU are boxed while the tools necessary to generate these representations are
circled. As can be seen in the right hand column of Figure 9, the design flow begins with
Design Flow
Figure 9: The design methodology used for the UCU. Representations of the UCU are
shown boxed while tools used to generate these representations are shown encircled.
the Verilog description of the UCU and ends with the Xilinx implementation.
Unfortunately, the only way to test the Xilinx implementation is to run it on a
Fugu node board. No simulator is capable of testing all of Fugu's chips in their intended
technology representations. This desired but unavailable simulator is called the "Ideal
simulator" in Figure 9.
Because Fugu node boards have not yet been built, the UCU has been tested in
two alternative representations: the original Verilog representation and an LSI gate level
representation. These tests form the remainder of Figure 9 and will be discussed in the
sections that follow. However, the design flow for the intended Xilinx representation is
described first.
5.1 Compiling the UCU for Xilinx
The design flow for the Xilinx implementation of the UCU is shown in the right
hand column of Figure 9. First, the Verilog code is compiled to Xilinx gates with
Synopsys. The output of Synopsys is run through XACT, which includes Xilinx's automatic
place and route tool, called ppr. Before ppr can be run, however, the design is floor
planned. Specifically, the memory cells in the TLB are placed in a logical structure so
that ppr will properly recognize and implement buses. The output of XACT is a bit
stream which can be downloaded directly onto the 4025 via the XChecker cable, another
Xilinx tool.
5.2 Verilog Testing
An obvious method to debug the UCU is to simulate the source file. Therefore,
the UCU has been tested for functionality at the Verilog level. Test vectors were created
to verify all functional operations of the UCU. Figure 7 and Figure 8 are examples of
such test vectors. Through this testing process, all known behavioral bugs have been
eliminated.
The Verilog testing actually implements slightly more of the UCU with Verilog
than will actually be used. To efficiently pack memory onto the Xilinx array, Xilinx hard
macros are utilized. These hard macros have no Verilog model, and therefore cannot be
simulated. Thus, a Verilog model of these hard macros has been created. Care was taken
to match the data book description of the macros as closely as possible. For this reason,
substituting the models should not cause any problems.
5.3 Node Level Testing
The Verilog simulation discussed in Section 5.2 essentially tests the UCU in
isolation. No accurate Verilog models exist for the UCU or for the Sparcle. Hence, they
have been approximated in these tests. The next logical step, of course, is simulation
with better models for all surrounding chips. To accomplish this goal, there are a few
options. The most obvious choices are to write better Verilog models for the rest of the
node or to utilize the gate level simulator already present for Alewife.
Neither of these options is straightforward to implement. It would be a complicated
task to rewrite the CMMU and Sparcle in Verilog. This process is prone to errors and
therefore would have marginal success, at best. For this reason, it is desirable to utilize
the existing gate level simulator of Alewife. If the UCU could be plugged in somehow, a
reliable simulation should result.
Unfortunately, the Alewife simulator, called NWO, has no facility for adding
Verilog modules. It can only utilize Behavioral Syntax Language (BSL) modules or LSI
100k gate level modules. Rewriting the UCU in BSL has the same problems as rewriting
the CMMU in Verilog; this process would be error prone because it is not automatic.
However, Synopsys automates Verilog to LSI 100k translation, much as it automates
Verilog to Xilinx translation. Therefore, Synopsys is used to target the UCU to the LSI
100k series gate arrays. The only translation which cannot be automated is that of the
Xilinx memory macros. For simulation of these macros, BSL modules are written and
substituted. Clearly, testing the UCU at the gate level is desirable because it is a step
closer to testing the intended Xilinx implementation (see Figure 9).
Once the LSI translation has taken place, the UCU is plugged into NWO, and
Sparcle assembly test vectors are written. The Sparcle test code used is quite extensive
and tests as much of the functionality of the UCU as possible. Furthermore, the code is
self-checking and will display error messages when failures are detected.
Throughout this testing process, many more bugs were found. Most of these bugs
involved the specific timing constraints of the bus interface, which could not be tested
accurately in the Verilog simulation. Furthermore, there were a few bugs involving
instances during which the CMMU spontaneously takes control of the buses. These cases
could not be foreseen during the Verilog testing. Regardless of the nature of the bugs
found, all that are known have been eliminated.
5.4 Untestable Issues
Unfortunately, successful testing at the Verilog and NWO levels does not ensure
correct operation on the 4025. There are many reasons for this unfortunate consequence.
The primary concern is the Xilinx memory macro which could not be tested at either
level. While the functionality of these macros is specified by the Xilinx manual, it was
empirically found that the real world performance of a relative of the 4025, the 4005, was
not always equivalent to that predicted by the manual. Because we cannot yet test on a
4025, it is unknown how the SRAM macros will perform for Fugu.
Furthermore, timing is extremely variable on Xilinx FPGAs. There are significant
delays incurred by the CLBs and the routing mechanisms on the chip. Every time the
design is routed with ppr, it is routed differently. This uncertainty leads to unpredictable
timing, which usually poses little problem, except for the SRAM macros and for the
tri-state buses. Fugu attempts to fix the SRAM setup and hold time problem by being
extremely conservative during write operations. Additionally, to lessen the chances of
glitches on the write enable signals, they are taken directly from flip-flop outputs. Fugu
eases the tri-state bus problem by only enabling tri-state buses during the second half of
the clock. The tri-state enable signals are allowed to settle during the first half of the
clock, thereby lessening the chances of contention during the second half of the clock.
Of course, this process reduces performance because the second half of the clock is
mostly wasted. Due to the size of the buses involved, it is impractical to use multiplexors
instead.
6 Performance
Although the UCU cannot yet be tested on its intended target, the Xilinx 4025,
much effort has been spent on predicting its performance once downloaded onto a 4025.
Many smaller versions of the UCU were tested on a smaller relative of the 4025, the 4005
[6]. These studies predicted that the translation path propagation delay of the UCU
would be between 155.5 and 186.6 ns when running on a 4025 with Xilinx speed grade
-4. Shortly, it will be seen that this prediction was extremely accurate, even though direct
comparison is difficult.
6.1 Methodology of The Past Prediction
The performance prediction discussed in [61 was made by comparing the real
world performance of 4005 circuits with that predicted by XDelay, Xilinx's timing analysis
tool. These comparisons showed that XDelay was conservative in its estimates, and that
the real world performance was about two thirds of XDelay's predictions. To arrive at
the prediction for the UCU's propagation delay, this two thirds correction factor was
applied to XDelay's calculations of the UCU's delays when placed and routed on the
4025.
While this procedure seems like a reasonable approximation, there is a fundamental
problem with applying the same correction factor to the most recent routs of the UCU.
Namely, XDelay has gone through a major revision since these predictions were made. It
is no longer known whether the two thirds correction factor applies. In fact, it may be
that the only applicable correction factor is now 1. Because of this uncertainty, XDelay's
current measurements must be modified cautiously.
Another development which may invalidate the previous prediction is a basic
architecture change. Significant translation path modifications have been made since
those measurements were made. Although not directly related to the translation path
propagation delay, the bus interface and its underlying circuitry has also been changed.
In fact, the bus interface has been completely overhauled. Furthermore, the measurements
were made without the presence of the secondary network or the GID check. Although
these modules do not directly add to the logic delays in the translation path, they do add
to the routing delay by constraining the logic placement. As expected with most modern
CMOS processes, the routing delay is a considerable portion of the overall delay. Because
of these architectural differences, identical circuits are not being compared when the
performance numbers are analyzed.
6.2 The UCU's Translation Path Performance
With the caveats discussed in Section 6.1 in mind, we may now proceed to
compare the predicted performance results to the measurements of the UCU's performance.
XDelay reports that the UCU's translation path propagation delay is 174.4 ns when run
on a 4025 with a speed grade of -4. Without applying a correction factor, it is obvious
that the prediction was correct. Taking into account the two thirds correction factor, the
UCU's delay should be about 116.3 ns, which is well below the past prediction. Considering
the large architectural changes and the major revision that XDelay has undergone, the
accuracy of the prediction is surprising but extremely promising.
7 Conclusion
The UCU implementation discussed in this document is functional, and it will
meet the needs of Fugu. It provides reliable translation and protection and is easy for the
supervisor to manipulate. User isolation and thus multiuser support should follow easily
from the foundation built by the TLB and the GID check. Furthermore, the secondary
network's performance is adequate for its intended uses.
The propagation delay incurred is considered reasonable for an FPGA
implementation of this gate size. Additionally, the delay should suite the needs of Fugu.
It is expected to be roughly 175 nanoseconds, which could be dramatically lowered by
hand compiling and routing the design.
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Appendix 1
Programming Interface
For an overview of the UCU instructions specified here, see Section 3.4. Note
that during execution of all UCU instructions, the UCU is utilizing the CMMU's XROM
interface, thereby guaranteeing an atomic sequence of events. Additionally, for read
instructions, no assumptions should be made about the values returned in bit fields
specified as "don't care."
Appendix 1.1 TLB Control
The TLB Control instruction manipulates the TLB's control registers, which include
the enable, context, and fault registers. Figure 10 depicts the formatting for this readable
and writable command.
The enable field represents the current state of operation. When the enable bit is
clear, all addresses are untranslated. This field, which is readable and writable, is cleared
by the reset signal.
Addr bus data: ASI = 0x50
31 0
< Don't Care>
Data bus data:
31 12 11 4 3 2 0
VPN (20) CID (8)
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
Supervisor
Read/Write
TLB Enable (1)
Fault Code (3)
Figure 10: TLB Control instruction formatting.
The Context ID field represents the current contents of the TLB's CID register.
The CID register is used as part of the tag for translation (see section 3.1.2). Additionally,
Group ID (GID) register is defined as the lower 7 bits of the CID register. This field is
both readable and writable.
The Fault Code and Virtual Page Number fields are read only and specify the
status of the last translation. After a TLB fault, they represent the resulting fault code and
the VPN which caused it. The fault codes are listed in Table 4. Assertion of the reset
signal causes the fault code to be set to all ones.
Appendix 1.2 Element Data
Addr bus data: ASI= 0x51
31 12 11 10 87 0
VPN (20) 1 IColumn (3)< Don't Car
Don't Care
Data bus data:
31 12 11 43 0
I PPN (20) <Unspecified> DGPP
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
Supervisor
Read/Write
Figure 11: Element Data.
The Element Data command reads or writes a specific element in the TLB's
memory arrays. The format for the command is shown in Figure 11.
The column and VPN field combine to specify the TLB element to operate on.
Not surprisingly, the column field specifies the TLB column to read or write. The lower
five bits of the supplied VPN are logically XORed with the TLB's CID register. The
result specifies the row to operate on.
On a read, element data returns the PPN and access control bits stored in the
specified TLB element. On a write, the PPN, the access control bits, and the tag supplied
by the VPN are written to the specified TLB element. The CID associated with the
written element comes from the TLB's CID register.
Appendix 1.3 Element Tag
Element Tag reads the tag part of a specific element in the TLB. This read only
command is provided for completeness and testing only. Under normal operating conditions,
Element Data and Element Random are used to write to the TLB while the Probe command
is used to find a matching tag. Figure 12 depicts the formatting used for Element Tag.
The TLB column to operate on is specified by the column field of the virtual
address supplied. The row of the TLB to access is calculated by the logical XOR of the
lower five bits of the supplied VPN and the CID register. The VPN and CID associated
with the specified element are returned.
Addr bus data: ASI = 0x52
31 12 11 10 8 7 0VPN (20) I Icolumn (3)< Don't Care
Don't Care 1
Data bus data:
31 12 11 43 0
I VPN (20) CID (8) I
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
Supervisor Read
<Unspecified> I
Figure 12: Element Tag. The VPN on the Address bus is supplied
by the user while the TLB returns the VPN on the data bus.
Element Random
Element Random writes the VPN, PPN, and access control bits supplied to a
random column in the TLB. The formatting of this write only command is shown in
Figure 13.
The row written to is calculated by the logical XOR of the lower 5 bits of the
VPN supplied and the TLB's CID register. The contents of the CID register is written to
the CID portion of the tag.
Addr bus data: ASI = 0x53
31 1211 0
I VPN (20) < Don't Care>
Data bus data:
31 12 11 43 0
PPN (20) <Unspecified> I DGPP
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
Supervisor Write
Figure 13: Element Random.
Appendix 1.5 Probe
The probe command looks up a VPN in the TLB. The formatting for this read
only command is shown in Figure 14.
The row examined is calculated by the logical XOR of the bottom five bits of the
VPN supplied and the TLB's CID register. If the supplied VPN results in no hit from any
column of the row specified, the hit field returns low and the remaining data returned is
unspecified. If there is a hit, the hit field returns high, and the PPN and protection bits
are returned. The column which contains the returned PPN is also returned.
Appendix 1.4
Addr bus data: ASI = OxD4
31 1211 0
I VPN (20) - < Don't Care>
Data bus data:
31 12 11 10 87 543 0
I PPN (20) 1I I IIDGPPI
<Unspecified>
Column(3)
<Unspecified>
Hit?
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
Supervisor Read
Figure 14: Probe Command.
Appendix 1.6 DMA Read Probe
The DMA read probe allows the user to perform virtual to physical address
translations for addresses to be included as a DMA block in message send operations.
This command is provided as an optimization for the steps necessary to begin a DMA
read. The formatting of this read only command is shown in Figure 15.
The VPN is translated to the PPN and returned as shown. For convenience, the
offset bits of the address are copied back to the data portion. Thus, the returned data is
usable as a complete physical address. The bottom three bits of the physical address
returned are zeroed because all DMA operations are double-word aligned.
Appendix 1.7 DMA Write Probe
The DMA Write Probe performs exactly the same function as the DMA Read
Probe except that the potential faults are slightly different. Instead of a DMA Read fault,
the DMA Write Probe could return the DMA Write fault. See Appendix 1.6 and Figure 15
for a description of its purpose and functionality.
Addr bus data:
31 1211 32 0
VPN (20) Offset (9) 0001
Data bus data:
31 1211 32 0
VPN (20) Offset (9) 00ooo
ASI = OxD5
Possible Faults:
Refill, Invalid,
User Fault,
DMA Read Fault
Access Mode:
User Read
Figure 15: DMA Read Probe. DMA Write Probe is identical except that
the DMA Write Probe can generate a DMA Write fault instead of a DMA
Read Fault. Additionally, the ASI of the DMA Write Probe is OxD6.
Appendix 1.8 SNET Output
Addr bus data:
31 54 210
< Don't Care>
Output Buffer Address (3)
Don't care (2)
Data bus data:
31 0
I< Secondary Network Data >
ASI = 0x58
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
User
Read/Write
Figure 16: SNET Output.
SNET Output reads from or writes to the secondary network's output buffers.
The format for this instruction is shown in Figure 16.
All 32 bits of the data bus are written to or read from the output buffer indexed by
the output buffer address field. The output buffer is eight entries deep.
Appendix 1.9 SNET Input
Addr bus data:
31 54 210
< Don't Care>
Input Buffer Address (3)
Don't care (2)
Data bus data:
31 0
I< Secondary Network Data >
ASI = 0x59
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
User Read
Figure 17: SNET Input.
The SNET Input command reads from the secondary network input buffer. The
format of this read only command is specified in Figure 17.
The address of the 32 bit input buffer is specified in the input buffer address field.
The input buffer is eight entries deep.
Appendix 1.10 SNET Machine Info
SNET Machine Info is used to set the size and local node number of the operating
Fugu machine. The format for this readable and writable command is shown in Figure 18.
The machine size field specifies the size of the operating Fugu multiprocessor
while the node ID field specifies the local node ID. Note that the node ID should never
be greater than the machine size.
Addr bus data:
31 0I < Don't Care>
Data bus data:
31 15 14 876 0
< Don't Care> Mach Size Node ID
Don't care
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
Supervisor
Read/Write
Figure 18: SNET Machine Info.
Addr bus data:
31 0
1 < Don't Care>
Data bus data on a read:
ASI = Ox5C
Possible Faults:
None
Access Mode:
User &
Supervisor
Read/Write
GID IRQ
Data bus data on a write:
31 181716 543210
I <Don't Care> I I< Don't Care> I1111
Reset GID IRQ -1 SNET Reset
SNET Gen Token
SNET Disable Receive
SNET Enable Receive
SNET Send
Figure 19: SNET Status/Command.
ASI = 0x5A
SNET Status/Command
The SNET Status/Command instruction has three main uses: to determine the
status of the secondary network, to send commands to the secondary network, or to
determine the cause of an external interrupt. This readable and writable command is
shown in Figure 19.
As can be seen, the format of this command is considerably different for reads
and writes. On a read, the bottom 16 bits of the returned data contain the secondary
network status code. This bit vector is described in [3]. The remaining two bits specify
who has caused an external interrupt, the GID check (in the GID IRQ field) or the
secondary network (in the SNET IRQ field). These signals are both active high and may
be active simultaneously.
An SNET Status/Command write triggers certain operations. All bit fields are
active high trigger signals. If the operation's bit field is a zero, the operation will not take
place. Note that some operations can take place simultaneously by executing a single
SNET Status/Command write.
The SNET Send bit causes the secondary network to send the current contents of
the secondary network's output buffers. The SNET Enable Receive and SNET Disable
Receive bits enable and disable the secondary network's ability to receive messages.
Enabling the secondary network also causes the SNET IRQ field to be reset low. SNET
Generate Token (SNET Gen Token) causes a token to be injected into the secondary
network. SNET Reset resets the secondary network. Finally, Reset GID IRQ resets the
GID IRQ to zero.
Appendix 1. 11
